来自Lessons and Challenges of the Indian Revolution-2014

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Lessons and Challenges of the Indian Revolution-2014
Ganapathy General Secretary,
CPI (Maoist)
The Message of the Central Committee of our party, issued on the occasion of its 10th anniversary, has given an overall evaluation of the past 10 years. Along with pointing out the gains and advances we have made, it has also drawn attention to the weaknesses and mistakes which hinder us and the favourable and unfavourable aspects of the objective situation. This article is an elaboration of some of the issues the CC Message has placed before the whole party, focussing on a few of the important lessons we must take and the challenges we must surmount. …Our party is leading the PLGA and the people in carrying on PPW against the ruling classes to complete the new democratic revolution.
This is a total war that should be fought protractedly in all spheres such as ideological, political, military, cultural, psychological and economic, focussed on the destruction of the Indian state and building a new state, at present concretised in the RPCs. If a small and weaker force is to defeat a big and mighty force, then it does not have any other way than waging such a war. The counter- revolutionary war carried on by the ruling classes to suppress the revolutionary war is also waged in all these spheres. It aims at wiping us out totally. Our party had this general understanding and we did achieve successes in practice by fighting back the counter-revolution. Yet we did not pay sufficient and timely attention to theorising these experiences. The enemy has developed its counter-revolutionary war strategy and tactics (Low Intensity Conflict or LIC) drawing on worldwide experiences. Therefore, in our theorisation, we too should have a broad vision, not staying restricted within our own experiences.
The task of summing up and preparing policy to face up to the enemy’s LIC strategy and tactics was taken up later. But this lapse resulted in delay in equipping the whole party with a deep understanding about the intensity, expanse and concreteness of the counter-revolutionary war as a total war in a comprehensive manner. This hindered us in tackling the challenges posed by the enemy’s new methods and achieving the successes we expected. Our party lost considerable number of comrades belonging to all levels, right from CC to the village level, in the offensives of the enemy. Though leadership losses began since 2005 May itself, they increased gradually after Unity Congress and the situation took a serious turn by 2011 end. The leadership failed to a large extent in defending itself and the ranks.
These losses weakened the three magic weapons of NDR – the party, PLGA and the UF – quite a lot. This failure is a very severe one. Sacrifices are inevitable in revolution. However, any revolution can be ultimately victorious only by destroying the enemy’s strength and developing its own strength. This is applicable to protracted people’s war (PPW) too. When the people take up arms, rebel and set out to wipe out the rulers, they will counterattack even more brutally. They will attack with utmost ferocity and cruelty to wipe out the revolution. The leadership that prepares to wage an armed revolution must achieve victory by fighting back counter-revolution and ultimately by wiping it out.
Defending the party from the offensives of the enemy during the course of war and from left and right deviations and advancing it towards victory would be a decisive factor for victory and the responsibility of the leadership. We should advance in PPW by defeating such attacks, by wiping out the enemy bit by bit and by increasing our strength step by step… During Naxalbari period, the most important reason for the setback of those days was the immense loss of subjective forces including Central leadership. This is applicable to the setback of the AP and Telangana movements too. The Peru revolution suffered a setback as almost the entire top leadership got arrested. These bitter experiences teach us the vital importance of protecting leadership and preserving subjective forces. This is an ideological and political issue. It is an issue which must be addressed at the strategic level. It is an issue pertaining to understanding the enemy’s LIC strategy and tactics. It is also an issue pertaining to building and strengthening of party, army and UF and developing mass base.
Though our party has a general understanding in all these matters, we suffered losses as we were liberal and lacked concreteness in our practice. The experiences of the past decade point out to our weakness in this regard. Though the objective situation is very favourable to the revolution, we cannot lead the revolution to victory without creating favourable situation in a planned manner and without continuously preserving and developing our subjective forces during the course of struggle. In the present situation where the enemy offensive is becoming more severe, when its surveillance and infiltration methods are becoming more sophisticated, backed by modern technology, we too must strengthen and upgrade our capacities and underground structures by formulating tactics and secret work methods that would help in preserving our subjective forces and we must implement those tactics with firm determination. Only by doing this, will we be able to develop them step by step.
We should keep in mind our own experiences, the teachings of the great Marxist teachers and the experiences imparted by the histories of revolutions of various countries and put efforts in this direction, to develop our party into a strong organisation advancing on the path of the invincible PPW… The relation between the development of people’s war and of mass work must be grasped properly. If we had rallied the peasantry and agricultural labourers and poor peasants more widely into the agrarian revolution in other rural areas and not only in the areas where RPCs are present, we could have further developed guerrilla warfare.

Similarly,shortcomings in rallying the middle classes newly developing in the rural areas and the oppressed social sections into the revolutionary movement have negatively impacted the development of guerrilla warfare. In the past ten years, the movements in plain areas and urban centres have weakened. We have also not been able to achieve notable improvement in mobilising vast non-peasant masses inside the guerrilla zones. Both of these have negatively impacted the successful implementation of our central task. But we also have the experiences where vast masses have rallied in the Nandigram, Lalgarh, Narayanapatna movements, the movement for separate Statehood for Telangana and anti-displacement movements in various parts of our country. These are new experiences we must cherish and learn from.
We should deeply probe them to grasp the social dynamics they reveal, new features they contain, as well as new forms of mass mobilisation they brought up and the potential they demonstrated for building broad unity of classes extending beyond rural areas into urban centres. It is true that we had formulated broad tactical guidelines in our ‘Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution’ document to build revolutionary movements in various types of plain areas, keeping in view the changes that occurred in our country. We also have a policy document regarding urban work. But it would do well to examine how much and how deeply the strategic importance of these two areas is grasped and how much effort has been made in taking forward this crucial work. Weaknesses in this regard and failure to work as needed have led to our loosing many subjective forces in these areas that were a soft target for enemy repression. The persisting lack in doing social investigation and study is one major reason for such weaknesses. The majority of the people who are becoming victims of imperialist, feudal and comprador bureaucratic bourgeois exploitation and oppression live in the vast plain areas and the urban ar- eas. Several movements are raging in the plains and the urban areas. The worldwide economic crisis is crushing the people of these two areas. There is not a single problem that they are not facing. There is no alternative to them other than revolution. And there is a lot of impact of the PW on the people of these areas.
The situation in these areas is thus objectively very favourable to the revolution. What is needed is a creative approach addressing the concreteness of the situation existing in such areas and the demands of various sections and classes among the masses. We already have decades of experience of working in such areas. Similarly, the experiences we gained in the past decade will also help us in working under the new circumstances. Drawing on these experiences, if we creatively work in a planned manner, employing new methods to suit the changed conditions and enemy’s tactics, we can certainly create opportunities to wage guerrilla war in these vast areas as part of PPW. When the enemy is carrying on a severe offensive on us to isolate us from the people and destroy us, we must follow tactics allowing us to protect and preserve our forces.
We preserve ourselves to fight even better and destroy the enemy. Therefore, while implementing the methods necessary to defend and preserve our forces, we should fulfil political, organisational and military tasks of the PPW and increase our mass base. The enemy’s policy is to isolate us from the people and destroy us. Our policy is to go more deeply into the people, integrate more closely with them and destroy the enemy. The favourable objective condition gives us good opportunities to do this. We should utilise them and politically rally the peasantry and various sections of people who are becoming victims of intensifying feudal and imperialist exploitation and oppression and mobilise them on various political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and other issues. The advanced elements that come to the fore in these struggles should be consolidated after raising their political and ideological consciousness. We must thus increase our mass base and subjective forces. We must take political initiative to utilise the contradictions among the enemies to serve this purpose by isolating the main enemy and hastening its end…